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In recent decades an increase of the meaning of bioethical cases in politi-
cal debates could be observed. They have 
been started in 1970 by Roe v. Wade abor-
tion case and, since then, included topics 
such as euthanasia, in vitro fertilization, 
and human enhancement. A common 
feature of all these cases is that they all, 
more or less, concern the matter of life, 
death, and human nature. That feature is 
also the main source of mutual misunder-
standing between debating people because 
they all base their arguments, convictions, 
and judgements on different concepts of 
life, death, and human nature. For some 
of them, life is God’s gift and death is 
a moment when God takes a human’s soul 
away. In this group, some claim that if life 
comes from God, it would be wrong to 
manipulate it by, e.g. genetic engineering, 
while the others claim that if life is a gift, 
hence it belongs to us, we should use it to 
the maximum and make it better. Obvi-
ously, there are other people who argue 
that death is not a moment, but a proc-
ess, and that presupposition lets them seek 
for criteria and arguments in favour of eu-
thanasia or earlier organ transplantations. 
Irrespective of the case we choose to dis-
cuss, we can notice that in all biopolitical 
debates people represent different ration-
alities, hence use different arguments that 
not always match each other. For instance, 
it is very likely that a person who uses ar-
guments referring to religious beliefs rep-
resents illogical, dogmatic or paradigmatic 
rationality while a person who uses secular 
arguments represents any other kind of ra-
tionality or dogma/paradigm in the afore-
mentioned ones. The outcome however is 
always the same. If both sides of debate 
represent different rationalities, they can-
not reach the point of mutual consensus. 
Nevertheless, some authors argue that the 
problem lies not in the variety of rationali-
ties and that reaching the consensus would 
be possible if we had more explicit argu-
ments to use in biopolitical debates.
One of these authors is a famous 
American political philosopher, Michael 
Sandel. Although he is known mainly for 
his lectures on justice and communitarian 
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criticism of liberalism, he had an episode 
(2002–2005) in The President’s Council 
on Bioethics (PCBE) where he has met 
other famous authors who shared his 
anxieties about the use of biotechnology, 
such as Francis Fukuyama or Leon Kass. 
Initially, a scientific result of Sandel’s par-
ticipation in PCBE was a short essay on 
genetic engineering but being convinced 
by his colleagues Sandel extended it and 
published it as a book about genetic en-
gineering, its place in the modern socie-
ties and political deliberations upon it. 
The reviewed here Przeciwko udoskon-
alaniu człowieka (its original title is The 
Case Against Perfection – for the sake of 
linguistic coherence I will be using it in 
the remainder), however, is not entirely 
a new stage in Sandel’s work. It is rather 
a peculiar continuation, though concern-
ing the new topics, of his previous thoughts 
present in Democracy’s Discontent: America 
in Search of a Public Philosophy (1998), 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1998), 
Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in 
Politics (2005) and some kind of a starting 
point to his next books: Justice: What’s the 
Right Thing to Do? (2010) and What Mon-
ey Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets 
(2012). For the sake of simplicity we can 
say that Sandel’s main idea in all his works 
basically remained the same, that if we 
are by nature encumbered to any kind of 
community, there is no possibility that we 
could always make free, independent and 
“conscious” choices, and that made him 
perceiving a community and preserving it 
as valuable. What was different, however, 
was how Sandel argued his conviction.
In The Case Against Perfection the au-
thor proposed us two things: to assume 
that biotechnological procedures do not 
raise any of our moral disagreements and 
to look not at the biotechnological means 
but at aims to which the means are used. 
Then he asked us to consider if and, if yes, 
how these procedures deprive us our free-
dom and humanity (p. 31). In more gener-
al terms, Sandel’s main aim in the reviewed 
book was to help us express our anxieties 
about the long-term social or political goals 
of using biotechnology in the form of well-
constructed, bioconservative argumenta-
tion that would share a common ground of 
rationality with transhumanists’ (or other 
bioliberals’) argumentation and could 
firmly stand against it. Did he succeed?
To answer this question we have to 
assume that it can be answered positively 
only if the author was able to elaborate 
other kind of argumentation than the one 
based on intuitions, i.e. irrational fears. 
It is that way because in the biopolitical 
debates “bioconservatives hold that we 
should honour intuitions about the special 
value of being human, even if we cannot 
identify reasons to ground those intui-
tions” (Roache, 2001). Yet at the very be-
ginning of the book, the author has made 
the task harder to himself by claiming that 
the argument of autonomy is insufficient 
in biopolitical debates (because it is based 
on the false premise that children who 
are not enhanced are always able to make 
free and independent choices). So, what 
did he propose to overcome this theoreti-
cal obstacle? In the five chapters referring 
to the different topics concerning various 
applications of human enhancement tech-
niques Sandel deliberated on the shape of 
societies pursuing children enhancement 
(chapters 1 and 3), possible changes in our 
perception of sport disciplines (chapter 2) 
and changes of our attitudes towards other 
people assuming that we had an enhance-
ment procedure (chapters 4 and 5). The 
author started his task by answering to an 
apparently simple question. What is the 
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difference between medical treatment that 
requires a genetic modification of human 
body and a procedure that is focused only 
on improving someone’s body and capabil-
ities? We could answer that the difference 
is in the initial intention of having such 
a procedure, but the possible outcomes 
eventually remain a mystery. Sandel how-
ever seemed to be more daring in predict-
ing them. He claimed that the permission 
to use enhancements always leads to the 
rise of two groups of people – those who 
have and those who have not an access to 
the enhancing technology. In his opinion, 
it always causes that people lose their hu-
manity. Why? The author tried to explain 
it on the example of sportsmen. Accord-
ing to him, we admire their unusual ca-
pabilities and an effort they take to win 
a competition, but, first of all, we admire 
their congenital talents. Using technology 
to equalise sportsmens’ chances would 
make us admire the artistry of pharma-
cists, says Sandel, instead of the natural 
talents of athletes (p. 33). However, the 
central point of Sandel’s argument of los-
ing humanity concerned not that that 
people will become equal but a fear that 
the possible increase of inequality between 
them will cause a decrease of meaning of 
three social values they all share, namely 
humility, responsibility, and solidarity 
(p. 79). The author argued that we are not 
able to be humble if we can control risk 
factors present in our lives; and that we 
cannot be responsible for our successes if 
we achieved them due to enhancements. 
Finally, he argued that we are solidary 
only if we cannot achieve a chosen aim in-
dividually, hence being perfect and able to 
act separately would certainly deprive us 
the potentiality of being solidary.
The reviewed book had a great poten-
tial of becoming the first serious theo-
retical opposition to the claims of tran-
shumanists and other bioliberals. This 
potential, however, was wasted in the 
moment in which Sandel introduced the 
categories of life as a gift and giftedness. 
The author was aware that “speaking of 
a gift presupposes a giver” (p. 84) and that 
the “giver” is unambiguously identified as 
God. Hence, to prove his arguments as 
valid means to prove the existence of God 
in the first place. Sandel tried to overcome 
this theoretical obstacle by claiming that 
appreciating the value of life as a gift is 
possible even without presuming that the 
giver is God. We cannot, however, accept 
this claim because it obviously is a logi-
cal fallacy, a classical petitio principi. Un-
fortunately for the argumentation in the 
book, it was almost entirely based on that 
premise. One can ask if one logical mis-
take can ruin all the author’s effort? Usu-
ally no but the case of the reviewed book 
was different from the very beginning. Let 
me remind that Sandel’s main aim in The 
Case Against Perfection was to propose the 
argumentation that would be based on the 
other premises than the  “intuitive” ones. 
Meanwhile, not only the main assumption 
but all arguments in the book are based 
on more or less general intuitions and ir-
rational fears about the future. The addi-
tional proof to that statement is that the 
author many times stated that although he 
tried to explain why we feel anxious about 
using biotechnology, it usually was not 
possible (p. 17, 19, 21, 24, 29, 31, 48, 60, 
77, 84, 85, 86). Therefore, the realisation 
of Sandel’s main goal was a failure, though 
not entirely. The author certainly helped 
us to understand the bioconservative way 
of reasoning in political debates on hu-
man enhancement cases, and then the 
bioconservative thinking in general. In my 
opinion, the latter fact alone is sufficient 
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enough to recommend the book to every 
person interested in the upcoming chang-
es of our understanding what is political. 
Also, Sandel’s book can certainly serve as 
a guide to religious believers how to declare 
their anxieties about human enhancement 
more clearly. But the greatest importance 
of Sandel’s work is that it explicitly ex-
presses a need of creating arguments that 
would be based less on intuitive and more 
on rational grounds, so they could be used 
to accurately defend the bioconservative 
beliefs and interests in the present and up-
coming biopolitical debates.
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